A dictionary attack automates the process of password guessing by cycling through a curated list of values — real words, leaked passwords, common character patterns, etc. The technique exploits weak authentication surfaces and scales easily across cloud-facing applications.
Capitalizing on poor password hygiene and weak credential policies, dictionary attack proves effective all too frequently. It succeeds where systems lack throttling, MFA enforcement, or centralized telemetry.
Attackers exploiting credential reuse don’t trigger traditional exploit defenses. In sprawling environments with hybrid identity systems, every successful guess can bypass perimeter controls, escalate access, and compromise internal services.
A dictionary attack is a cyber attack using a specific brute-force credential guessing technique that targets authentication systems using predetermined lists of potential passwords or passphrases. It falls under tactic T1110.001 — Brute Force: Password Guessing in the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Unlike general brute-force methods, which iterate through every possible character combination, dictionary attacks use human-generated values, such as:
Attackers attempt dictionary attacks across the range of authentication points — login portals, APIs, SSH endpoints, remote desktop gateways — where input validation fails to detect abnormal login frequency or pattern abuse. The approach relies less on algorithmic sophistication and more on behavioral predictability in password selection.
Commonly associated terms include credential guessing, offline attack (when targeting password hashes), and password spraying (when attempting a single common password across multiple accounts). While credential spraying emphasizes breadth across users, dictionary attacks focus on depth against a specific account or secret.
Early dictionary attacks targeted Unix shadow files and Windows SAM databases, using local hash files and rainbow tables to crack passwords offline. Attackers would steal the hashes then CPU-optimized tools like John the Ripper to iterate through dictionary files.
Attacks of this nature succeeded because of weak password creation policies and unsalted hashing. Despite advances in storage and authentication practices, dictionary-based guessing remains effective because humans still choose predictable credentials. Even in sophisticated environments, attackers continue to find fallback login pages, VPN concentrators, and unmonitored development portals. Entry is one oversight away.
Today’s threat actors exploit API keys, CI/CD secrets, and federated login flows with dictionary attack techniques. Cloud IAM roles, SaaS administrator accounts, and DevOps credentials often become primary targets because they unlock lateral access and persistent footholds.
Attackers can source lists from breached databases, GitHub repositories, configuration leaks, and even language model outputs. With GPU-accelerated hash cracking and automated attack orchestration, dictionary attacks operate with speed and scale previously infeasible. The tactic now forms part of credential access campaigns alongside phishing, token theft, and session hijacking.
Dictionary attacks remain effective because password policies remain guessable and authentication telemetry remains disconnected from centralized detection logic. Any system that accepts user-supplied secrets is a candidate for enumeration.
A dictionary attack succeeds by exploiting predictable inputs in authentication workflows. Attackers use curated lists crafted from years of human error, breach data, and linguistic patterns. The threat unfolds through precision automation, rather than brute force.
An attacker begins by identifying a target system that accepts user-supplied secrets, typically a login portal, API, or SSH endpoint. Using reconnaissance tools or DNS enumeration, they find public interfaces that expose authentication mechanisms. They then initiate the attack.
Attackers don’t launch dictionary attacks manually. They rely on distributed infrastructure and purpose-built tooling:
They may also use rotating user agents, random delays, or CAPTCHA solvers to bypass behavioral detection. Attack orchestration frequently runs in CI/CD pipelines or via remote control panels in initial access broker kits.
A dictionary attack doesn’t need to exploit CVEs. It abuses design oversights and behavioral predictability across layers:
Web applications remain especially vulnerable when login error responses differ between incorrect usernames and incorrect passwords. That distinction leaks valuable signals to attackers.
In practice, dictionary attacks rarely stand alone. They feed into broader campaigns:
For example, an attacker might, for example, locate an exposed Jenkins instance, extract credentials.xml, and run a dictionary attack against each user credential with known password patterns or default Jenkins secrets.

Figure 1: Sample Python script with request
A more advanced script would randomize headers, introduce time delays, and log failed attempts without blocking on each request.
A dictionary attack typically operates as a precursor, an enabler, or an augmentation within broader adversary workflows. Its simplicity masks its strategic utility — attackers use it to gain footholds, validate compromised credentials, or brute-force low-visibility access points in parallel with more complex tactics.
Most dictionary attacks serve as an entry point. With the goal of breaching a single account, threat actors target exposed authentication services such as web portals, remote access tools, or API endpoints. When attackers find valid credentials, they gain an authenticated session without triggering exploits or executing payloads.
Initial access via dictionary attack offers several advantages:
Common targets include WordPress admin panels, OpenVPN login forms, GitLab instances, and cloud service management interfaces.
Successful execution depends on several enabling conditions that determine whether the attack is feasible.
Attackers often perform mass reconnaissance before attempting authentication. They use tools like Shodan, Censys, and Masscan to identify live services with open ports and login pages and map those targets to high-probability dictionaries built from past breaches.
A successful dictionary attack merely unlocks the door. Once authenticated, the attacker typically:
In cases where MFA blocks access post-login, attackers pivot. They may deliver phishing payloads tailored to MFA bypass, scrape session cookies via token theft, or exploit poor MFA fallback workflows to escalate.
Dictionary attacks rarely operate in isolation. They intersect with multiple kill chain stages:
In hybrid environments, attackers may first compromise a low-privilege user account through dictionary attack, then use that access to query group memberships, escalate via cloud roles, and impersonate privileged identities.
Dictionary attacks continue to feature prominently in real-world breaches, especially where weak authentication policies intersect with public-facing services. While often overshadowed by zero-days and ransomware, these attacks remain foundational in campaigns targeting identity, access, and control.
In late 2023, the CitrixBleed vulnerability (CVE-2023-4966) exposed session token leakage in Citrix Gateway appliances. Attackers capitalized on the incident by pairing harvested session data with targeted dictionary attacks to compromise additional administrator accounts. Many organizations had lax secrets management, failing to rotate passwords or enforce MFA, which allowed access reuse against known usernames.
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) warned that advanced persistent threat (APT) actors used these dictionary-driven access attempts to pivot laterally into VPN infrastructure and cloud management planes. In sectors like healthcare and education, where legacy access policies remained in place, attackers gained persistent administrative footholds without triggering anomaly detection.
In August 2023, threat actor "IntelBroker" claimed responsibility for breaching ZoomInfo by performing a credential-based attack against a publicly exposed administrative panel. ZoomInfo confirmed that the attacker gained access using a dictionary attack against login credentials, validating a leaked username and iterating password guesses from previously breached corpuses.
Although MFA was eventually enforced, the attacker successfully exfiltrated partial customer datasets before detection. The data breach underscored how dictionary attacks bypass control layers when session token capture or weak password reuse occur in tandem.
IBM's X-Force Threat Intelligence Index for 2024 cited password-guessing techniques, including dictionary attacks, as one of the top three initial access vectors observed in cloud intrusions. Attackers routinely used dictionary scripts against exposed cloud login portals (e.g., Azure AD and AWS IAM) with success rates tied directly to policy leniency and user behavior.
Organizations in the financial sector, where staff often manage multiple environments through legacy credentials, were particularly vulnerable. In several red team assessments, testers gained access to production CI/CD environments by using environment-specific usernames and password lists derived from previous engagements or OSINT.
Dictionary attacks generate unique behavioral and forensic artifacts — if you know where to look. They rarely involve malware or persistence mechanisms in the initial phase. Detection relies on telemetry, context, and well-tuned baselines.
Most dictionary attacks begin with large volumes of authentication attempts targeting the same user or endpoint. They often follow deterministic patterns that differ from legitimate user behavior.
When attackers use distributed infrastructure, the source IPs may rotate. In such cases, defenders should correlate on the username or endpoint path rather than origin address alone.
Even distributed dictionary attacks — those performed across botnets or cloud microservices — exhibit consistency in intent.
In hybrid identity systems, attackers may jump across SSO providers, attempting identical credentials in Okta, Azure AD, or legacy LDAP portals.
SIEM and XDR platforms can detect dictionary attacks with tailored correlation logic, provided authentication telemetry is centralized and accessible.
High-fidelity detection queries include:
Raw indicators rarely surface meaningful alerts without context. Correlating login failures can reduce false positives while elevating confidence scores. Correlations might include:
Security teams should also tune UEBA (User and Entity Behavior Analytics) platforms to flag credential use that diverges from behavioral baselines.
Effective defense against dictionary attacks requires layered safeguards across authentication logic, identity infrastructure, and perimeter visibility. Security leaders must implement controls that interrupt both the brute-force mechanism and the credential validation path. Relying on password complexity policies alone will not stop a determined adversary equipped with automation.
Authentication endpoints must tolerate legitimate user behavior while remaining hostile to automated guessing. Design authentication workflows to disrupt enumeration and slow down credential testing without degrading usability. Critical code and configuration controls include:
Avoid implementing login rate limiting in frontend JavaScript or on the client side. Enforcement must occur server-side or at the reverse proxy.
While password composition rules have diminishing returns, identity infrastructure can block attacks before passwords even matter. Essential IAM and MFA strategies include:
Relying on password complexity rules without MFA gives a false sense of security. Attackers adapt faster than password policy updates.
Blocking dictionary attacks at the edge buys time for detection and slows adversary progress. Implement layered controls that make credential guessing costly and time-consuming. Tactical network and segmentation controls include:
Attackers don’t need advanced tools when organizations fail to educate users or enforce accountability. Human-centric mitigations include:
Effective prevention doesn’t rely on a single choke point. It assumes credential guessing will occur and designs the system to limit its success, surface its presence, and contain its blast radius.
Organizations that detect or confirm a successful dictionary attack must respond with urgency and precision. The response should eliminate the adversary’s foothold, restore the integrity of identity systems, and close systemic gaps that enabled the intrusion.
First responders must act to halt further credential testing or account misuse without tipping off the attacker too early. Rapid containment limits escalation while preserving forensic data.
If attackers exploited service accounts, rotate all affected credentials and check downstream integrations for anomalous activity.
Response requires more than containment — it demands coordinated action across engineering, infrastructure, and security leadership.
A dictionary attack rarely exposes only one weakness. Organizations must review what the attacker exploited and why detection failed.
Recovery without reform guarantees recurrence. Once secure, organizations must redesign authentication exposure.
Credential stuffing and credential spraying both involve unauthorized login attempts using compromised credentials, but the two attack methods differ.
Credential stuffing uses large sets of breached username-password pairs and attempts to log in across many services. Attackers rely on password reuse, targeting known combinations per user across multiple platforms.
Credential spraying uses a small number of common passwords — like Welcome123 or Spring2024! — against many usernames. It avoids account lockouts by spreading attempts thinly across users.
Unsalted hashing refers to hashing a password without adding a unique, random value (a salt) before the hash function processes it. When a system stores unsalted password hashes, identical passwords produce identical hashes, making them vulnerable to precomputed attacks like rainbow tables or simple dictionary matching. For example:
Without salting:
Salting adds a user-specific random string to the password before hashing, so even identical passwords generate different hashes. Most modern systems combine salting with key stretching algorithms like bcrypt, scrypt, or Argon2 to slow down guessing attempts and neutralize dictionary-based hash cracking.